feat: account connect

internal/handler/auth.go

@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ type verifyReq struct {
 	Token string `json:"token"`
 }
 
+type verifyLoginOTPReq struct {
+	Email    string `json:"email"`
+	Password string `json:"password"`
+	OTP      string `json:"otp"`
+}
+
 type setEmailReq struct {
 	Email string `json:"email"`
 }
@@ -92,7 +98,14 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) SignUp(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	response.JSON(w, http.StatusCreated, res.User)
 }
 
-// LogIn authenticates an existing user.
+// LogIn authenticates an existing user. The response is one of:
+//
+//   - 200 OK with the User JSON — credentials verified, session cookie set,
+//     frontend treats this as fully signed in.
+//   - 202 Accepted with `{ "otp_required": true }` — credentials verified
+//     but the account has been unverified for over 30 days. An OTP has been
+//     emailed; frontend must collect it and call VerifyLoginOTP next. No
+//     session cookie is set on this branch.
 func (h *AuthHandler) LogIn(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	var req logInReq
 	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
@@ -112,6 +125,40 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) LogIn(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		h.renderAuthErr(w, err)
 		return
 	}
+	if res.OTPRequired {
+		response.JSON(w, http.StatusAccepted, map[string]any{
+			"otp_required": true,
+		})
+		return
+	}
+	auth.Set(w, res.Auth.Token, res.Auth.Expires, h.cookies)
+	response.JSON(w, http.StatusOK, res.Auth.User)
+}
+
+// VerifyLoginOTP completes a login that was gated by the stale-unverified
+// OTP path. Re-checks the password (the OTP alone isn't enough — an
+// attacker who steals the OTP email still needs the password), validates
+// the OTP, flips email_verified_at to now(), and sets the session cookie.
+func (h *AuthHandler) VerifyLoginOTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	var req verifyLoginOTPReq
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+		response.Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body")
+		return
+	}
+	v := validator.New()
+	validator.Required(v, "email", req.Email)
+	validator.Required(v, "password", req.Password)
+	validator.Required(v, "otp", req.OTP)
+	if !v.Valid() {
+		response.Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, v.Error())
+		return
+	}
+
+	res, err := h.svc.VerifyLoginOTP(r.Context(), req.Email, req.Password, req.OTP)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.renderAuthErr(w, err)
+		return
+	}
 	auth.Set(w, res.Token, res.Expires, h.cookies)
 	response.JSON(w, http.StatusOK, res.User)
 }
@@ -260,6 +307,19 @@ func (h *AuthHandler) SetEmail(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	response.JSON(w, http.StatusOK, u)
 }
 
+// LinkedProviders — protected — returns the OAuth provider names already
+// linked to the caller's account. Settings UI uses this to flip each
+// social-connect row between "Connect" and "Connected".
+func (h *AuthHandler) LinkedProviders(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	uid := middleware.UserID(r.Context())
+	providers, err := h.svc.LinkedProviders(r.Context(), uid)
+	if err != nil {
+		response.Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "could not load linked providers")
+		return
+	}
+	response.JSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"providers": providers})
+}
+
 // ResendVerification — protected — refires the verification email for the
 // currently-logged-in user.
 func (h *AuthHandler) ResendVerification(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

internal/handler/oauth.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+	"github.com/prabhupadasays/spsays-bff/internal/middleware"
 	"github.com/prabhupadasays/spsays-bff/internal/service"
 	"github.com/prabhupadasays/spsays-bff/pkg/auth"
 	"github.com/prabhupadasays/spsays-bff/pkg/oauth"
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ func (h *OAuthHandler) Start(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	next := sanitizeNext(r.URL.Query().Get("next"))
 
-	state, err := oauth.EncodeState(h.stateSecret, providerName, next)
+	state, err := oauth.EncodeState(h.stateSecret, providerName, next, "")
 	if err != nil {
 		h.logger.Error("oauth encode state", zap.Error(err))
 		http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ func (h *OAuthHandler) Callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
 	})
 
-	stateProvider, next, err := oauth.DecodeState(h.stateSecret, stateQ)
+	stateProvider, next, linkUserID, err := oauth.DecodeState(h.stateSecret, stateQ)
 	if err != nil || stateProvider != providerName {
 		h.redirectErr(w, r, "/login?oauth_error=invalid_state")
 		return
@@ -161,6 +162,14 @@ func (h *OAuthHandler) Callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	// State pinned to a user id means the OAuth round-trip was started from
+	// /link/start (settings page). Dispatch to the link path so we link the
+	// provider to that user instead of running a fresh sign-in.
+	if linkUserID != "" {
+		h.finishLink(w, r, providerName, next, linkUserID, prof)
+		return
+	}
+
 	res, err := h.svc.SignInWithOAuth(r.Context(), service.OAuthProfile{
 		Provider:       prof.Provider,
 		ProviderUserID: prof.ProviderUserID,
@@ -184,6 +193,89 @@ func (h *OAuthHandler) Callback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	http.Redirect(w, r, h.frontendURL+next, http.StatusFound)
 }
 
+// LinkStart kicks off the OAuth round-trip for an already-authenticated
+// user who wants to add a provider to their account (settings → Connect).
+// The caller's user id is signed into the state so the callback knows
+// which account to link to instead of trying to find one by email.
+func (h *OAuthHandler) LinkStart(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	providerName := chi.URLParam(r, "provider")
+	prov, err := h.providers.Get(providerName)
+	if err != nil {
+		http.Error(w, "unknown provider", http.StatusNotFound)
+		return
+	}
+
+	uid := middleware.UserID(r.Context())
+	if uid == "" {
+		http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+	next := sanitizeNext(r.URL.Query().Get("next"))
+
+	state, err := oauth.EncodeState(h.stateSecret, providerName, next, uid)
+	if err != nil {
+		h.logger.Error("oauth encode link state", zap.Error(err))
+		http.Error(w, "internal error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
+		return
+	}
+
+	http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
+		Name:     stateCookieName,
+		Value:    state,
+		Path:     "/api/v1/auth/oauth",
+		Domain:   h.cookies.Domain,
+		MaxAge:   stateCookieMaxAge,
+		HttpOnly: true,
+		Secure:   h.cookies.Secure,
+		SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
+	})
+
+	cfg := prov.Config(h.callbackURL(providerName))
+	authURL := cfg.AuthCodeURL(state, prov.AuthCodeOptions()...)
+	http.Redirect(w, r, authURL, http.StatusFound)
+}
+
+// finishLink completes the link flow once the shared Callback has decoded
+// state and fetched the provider profile. Bounces back to the frontend
+// `next` path with `?link=ok|claimed|error` so the settings UI can render
+// a meaningful message.
+func (h *OAuthHandler) finishLink(
+	w http.ResponseWriter,
+	r *http.Request,
+	providerName, next, linkUserID string,
+	prof *oauth.Profile,
+) {
+	err := h.svc.LinkOAuthToCurrentUser(r.Context(), linkUserID, service.OAuthProfile{
+		Provider:       prof.Provider,
+		ProviderUserID: prof.ProviderUserID,
+		Email:          prof.Email,
+		EmailVerified:  prof.EmailVerified,
+		Name:           prof.Name,
+		AvatarURL:      prof.AvatarURL,
+	})
+	target := next
+	switch {
+	case err == nil:
+		target = appendQuery(next, "link", providerName+":ok")
+	case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthAccountClaimed):
+		target = appendQuery(next, "link", providerName+":claimed")
+	default:
+		h.logger.Error("oauth link", zap.String("provider", providerName), zap.Error(err))
+		target = appendQuery(next, "link", providerName+":error")
+	}
+	http.Redirect(w, r, h.frontendURL+target, http.StatusFound)
+}
+
+// appendQuery adds a ?key=val (or &key=val) to a same-origin path, preserving
+// any existing query string. Path must start with "/" — caller guarantees.
+func appendQuery(path, key, value string) string {
+	sep := "?"
+	if strings.Contains(path, "?") {
+		sep = "&"
+	}
+	return path + sep + url.QueryEscape(key) + "=" + url.QueryEscape(value)
+}
+
 // callbackURL composes the redirect_uri the provider's console must allow-list.
 func (h *OAuthHandler) callbackURL(provider string) string {
 	return h.bffPublicURL + "/api/v1/auth/oauth/" + provider + "/callback"

internal/model/user.go

@@ -62,6 +62,11 @@ type AuthToken struct {
 const (
 	PurposePasswordReset     = "password_reset"
 	PurposeEmailVerification = "email_verification"
+	// PurposeLoginOTP is a 6-digit one-time code emailed to a user whose
+	// account has been unverified for >30 days. Verification happens
+	// per-user (FindValidForUser), so the 1M-keyspace can't be brute-forced
+	// offline by hash collision — only online against rate limits.
+	PurposeLoginOTP = "login_otp"
 )
 
 // OAuthAccount represents a row in the `oauth_accounts` table — one entry

internal/repository/oauth_account_repo.go

@@ -44,6 +44,31 @@ func (r *OAuthAccountRepo) FindByProvider(ctx context.Context, provider, provide
 	return a, nil
 }
 
+// ListProvidersForUser returns the distinct provider names linked to this
+// user, ordered alphabetically. Used by the settings UI to mark each
+// social-connect row as "Connected" vs "Connect".
+func (r *OAuthAccountRepo) ListProvidersForUser(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]string, error) {
+	const q = `
+		SELECT DISTINCT provider
+		FROM oauth_accounts
+		WHERE user_id = $1
+		ORDER BY provider`
+	rows, err := r.pg.Pool.Query(ctx, q, userID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("list oauth providers: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer rows.Close()
+	out := []string{}
+	for rows.Next() {
+		var p string
+		if err := rows.Scan(&p); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("scan oauth provider: %w", err)
+		}
+		out = append(out, p)
+	}
+	return out, rows.Err()
+}
+
 // Link inserts a new oauth_accounts row tying a provider identity to an
 // existing user. Idempotent: a second call for the same (provider, sub)
 // returns the existing row instead of erroring on the unique constraint.

internal/repository/user_repo.go

@@ -380,6 +380,32 @@ func (r *AuthTokenRepo) FindValid(ctx context.Context, tokenHash, purpose string
 	return t, nil
 }
 
+// FindValidForUser returns a non-used, non-expired token by user + hash +
+// purpose. Used by the OTP login flow where the keyspace is small (6
+// digits) — scoping by user_id prevents a global hash-collision lookup.
+func (r *AuthTokenRepo) FindValidForUser(ctx context.Context, userID, tokenHash, purpose string) (*model.AuthToken, error) {
+	const q = `
+		SELECT id, user_id, purpose, token_hash, expires_at, used_at, created_at
+		FROM auth_tokens
+		WHERE user_id    = $1
+		  AND token_hash = $2
+		  AND purpose    = $3
+		  AND used_at    IS NULL
+		  AND expires_at > now()
+		LIMIT 1`
+
+	t := &model.AuthToken{}
+	err := r.pg.Pool.QueryRow(ctx, q, userID, tokenHash, purpose).
+		Scan(&t.ID, &t.UserID, &t.Purpose, &t.TokenHash, &t.ExpiresAt, &t.UsedAt, &t.CreatedAt)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
+			return nil, ErrUserNotFound
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("find token: %w", err)
+	}
+	return t, nil
+}
+
 // Consume marks a token as used. After this call the token can never be
 // honoured again, even if it has not yet expired.
 func (r *AuthTokenRepo) Consume(ctx context.Context, id string) error {

internal/server/server.go

@@ -503,6 +503,7 @@ func (s *Server) setupRouter() {
 			}
 			r.Post("/signup", s.authH.SignUp)
 			r.Post("/login", s.authH.LogIn)
+			r.Post("/verify-login-otp", s.authH.VerifyLoginOTP)
 			r.Post("/logout", s.authH.LogOut)
 			r.Post("/forgot-password", s.authH.ForgotPassword)
 			r.Post("/reset-password", s.authH.ResetPassword)
@@ -520,9 +521,18 @@ func (s *Server) setupRouter() {
 			r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
 				r.Use(middleware.RequireAuth(s.authIssuer, s.userRepo))
 				r.Get("/me", s.authH.Me)
+				r.Get("/linked-providers", s.authH.LinkedProviders)
 				r.Post("/email", s.authH.SetEmail)
 				r.Post("/change-password", s.authH.ChangePassword)
 				r.Post("/resend-verification", s.authH.ResendVerification)
+				// Link-provider flow — requires the caller to be signed
+				// in; the state encodes their id so the callback links to
+				// THIS user instead of running the normal sign-in path.
+				// The callback itself is the shared /oauth/{provider}/callback
+				// above — the state's link_user_id field switches behaviour.
+				if s.oauthH != nil {
+					r.Get("/oauth/{provider}/link/start", s.oauthH.LinkStart)
+				}
 			})
 		})
 

internal/service/auth_service.go

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"crypto/rand"
 	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/binary"
 	"encoding/hex"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
@@ -129,10 +130,32 @@ func (s *AuthService) SignUp(ctx context.Context, email, password, name string)
 	return s.issueSession(u)
 }
 
+// LoginResult is the two-state outcome of LogIn:
+//
+//   - `Auth != nil`        — credentials verified AND email is fine. Caller
+//     sets the session cookie and returns the user.
+//   - `OTPRequired == true` — credentials verified but the account has been
+//     unverified for more than 30 days. An OTP has been emailed; the caller
+//     must collect it from the user and call VerifyLoginOTP to complete the
+//     sign-in. No session cookie is set yet.
+//
+// One of the two is always set on a non-error return.
+type LoginResult struct {
+	Auth        *AuthResult
+	OTPRequired bool
+}
+
+// staleUnverifiedAge is how long an account can stay unverified before
+// every subsequent email/password login is gated on an OTP. Anything
+// shorter and a normal user who simply hasn't checked their inbox yet
+// would hit the gate; longer and abandoned-but-not-verified accounts
+// remain a forever-credential. 30 days is the documented requirement.
+const staleUnverifiedAge = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
+
 // LogIn authenticates a user by email + password. The error returned for an
 // unknown email is intentionally identical to a wrong password — never leak
-// which one was wrong.
+// which one was wrong. May return early with OTPRequired=true; see LoginResult.
-func (s *AuthService) LogIn(ctx context.Context, email, password string) (*AuthResult, error) {
+func (s *AuthService) LogIn(ctx context.Context, email, password string) (*LoginResult, error) {
 	u, err := s.users.FindByEmail(ctx, email)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, repository.ErrUserNotFound) {
@@ -148,7 +171,97 @@ func (s *AuthService) LogIn(ctx context.Context, email, password string) (*AuthR
 	if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(*u.PasswordHash), []byte(password)); err != nil {
 		return nil, ErrInvalidCredentials
 	}
-	return s.issueSession(u)
+
+	// OTP gate — unverified email AND account is older than the grace
+	// window. Mint an OTP and signal the caller to collect it. We do NOT
+	// issue a session here.
+	if u.EmailVerifiedAt == nil && time.Since(u.CreatedAt) > staleUnverifiedAge {
+		if u.Email == nil || *u.Email == "" {
+			// No email to send to → fall through to "invalid credentials"
+			// rather than expose this corner case.
+			return nil, ErrInvalidCredentials
+		}
+		if err := s.sendLoginOTP(ctx, u); err != nil {
+			s.logger.Warn("login otp send failed",
+				zap.String("user", u.ID), zap.Error(err))
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("send login otp: %w", err)
+		}
+		return &LoginResult{OTPRequired: true}, nil
+	}
+
+	res, err := s.issueSession(u)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &LoginResult{Auth: res}, nil
+}
+
+// VerifyLoginOTP completes a login that was paused by the stale-unverified
+// OTP gate. Re-checks the password (so an attacker who steals an OTP email
+// still can't sign in without the password), validates the OTP, flips
+// email_verified_at to now(), and issues a fresh session.
+func (s *AuthService) VerifyLoginOTP(ctx context.Context, email, password, otp string) (*AuthResult, error) {
+	u, err := s.users.FindByEmail(ctx, email)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidCredentials
+	}
+	if u.PasswordHash == nil {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidCredentials
+	}
+	if err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(*u.PasswordHash), []byte(password)); err != nil {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidCredentials
+	}
+
+	otpHash := hashToken(otp)
+	tok, err := s.tokens.FindValidForUser(ctx, u.ID, otpHash, model.PurposeLoginOTP)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, ErrInvalidOrExpiredLink
+	}
+	if err := s.tokens.Consume(ctx, tok.ID); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := s.users.MarkEmailVerified(ctx, u.ID); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	u2, err := s.users.FindByID(ctx, u.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return s.issueSession(u2)
+}
+
+// sendLoginOTP mints a fresh 6-digit code, invalidates any older pending
+// codes, stores the SHA-256 hash, and emails the raw code to the user.
+func (s *AuthService) sendLoginOTP(ctx context.Context, u *model.User) error {
+	if u.Email == nil || *u.Email == "" {
+		return errors.New("no email on file")
+	}
+	_ = s.tokens.InvalidatePending(ctx, u.ID, model.PurposeLoginOTP)
+
+	otp, hash, err := newOTP()
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if _, err := s.tokens.Create(ctx, u.ID, model.PurposeLoginOTP, hash, 10*time.Minute); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	body := loginOTPEmail(u.Name, otp)
+	return s.mail.Send(*u.Email, "Your login code — Prabhupāda Says", body)
+}
+
+// newOTP returns a freshly-generated 6-digit code + its SHA-256 hex hash.
+// Modulo bias on a uniform 32-bit source is negligible for the 1M keyspace
+// (10⁶ / 2³² ≈ 4 parts in 10⁴) and irrelevant against rate-limited online
+// guessing, which is the only attack model we care about for this size.
+func newOTP() (raw, hash string, err error) {
+	var b [4]byte
+	if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
+		return "", "", err
+	}
+	n := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b[:]) % 1_000_000
+	raw = fmt.Sprintf("%06d", n)
+	hash = hashToken(raw)
+	return raw, hash, nil
 }
 
 // OAuthProfile is the provider-agnostic profile shape consumed by
@@ -168,6 +281,49 @@ type OAuthProfile struct {
 // startup). Handler maps to 503.
 var ErrOAuthUnavailable = errors.New("oauth service unavailable")
 
+// ErrOAuthAccountClaimed is returned by LinkOAuthToCurrentUser when the
+// provider identity is already linked to a different user. We refuse to
+// move the linkage — the rightful owner of the OAuth account at the
+// provider can sign in via the normal flow.
+var ErrOAuthAccountClaimed = errors.New("oauth account already linked to another user")
+
+// LinkOAuthToCurrentUser ties an OAuth provider identity to a specific
+// already-authenticated user (settings → Connect flow). Refuses to move
+// the linkage if some other user already claims it.
+//
+// Email policy: the user's primary email is NEVER touched by this call.
+// The provider's email is stored on the oauth_accounts row only for
+// reference (display in the future, audit). If the user wants to change
+// their primary email they have to do it explicitly via SetEmail.
+func (s *AuthService) LinkOAuthToCurrentUser(ctx context.Context, userID string, prof OAuthProfile) error {
+	if s.oauth == nil {
+		return ErrOAuthUnavailable
+	}
+
+	// If this (provider, sub) is already linked, the only valid case is
+	// that it's linked to the SAME user we're trying to link to. Any other
+	// user owning this linkage means the OAuth account was already claimed
+	// (typically the user mis-clicked or it's a different person on a
+	// shared device) — refuse rather than silently steal it.
+	if existing, err := s.oauth.FindByProvider(ctx, prof.Provider, prof.ProviderUserID); err == nil {
+		if existing.UserID != userID {
+			return ErrOAuthAccountClaimed
+		}
+		// Same user — idempotent: refresh the denormalised profile fields
+		// and return success.
+		_, err := s.oauth.Link(ctx, userID, prof.Provider, prof.ProviderUserID,
+			optStr(prof.Email), optStr(prof.Name), optStr(prof.AvatarURL))
+		return err
+	} else if !errors.Is(err, repository.ErrOAuthAccountNotFound) {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	// Fresh link.
+	_, err := s.oauth.Link(ctx, userID, prof.Provider, prof.ProviderUserID,
+		optStr(prof.Email), optStr(prof.Name), optStr(prof.AvatarURL))
+	return err
+}
+
 // SignInWithOAuth turns a provider profile into a session. Three-step lookup:
 //
 //  1. Existing linkage on (provider, provider_user_id) → log that user in.
@@ -312,6 +468,18 @@ func optStr(s string) *string {
 	return &s
 }
 
+// LinkedProviders returns the OAuth provider names already linked to the
+// caller's account ("google", "facebook"). Used by the settings UI to flip
+// the per-provider rows between "Connect" and "Connected".
+func (s *AuthService) LinkedProviders(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]string, error) {
+	if s.oauth == nil {
+		// OAuth repo not wired (no Postgres). No-op rather than erroring —
+		// settings just shows everything as un-connected.
+		return []string{}, nil
+	}
+	return s.oauth.ListProvidersForUser(ctx, userID)
+}
+
 // ChangePassword sets the caller's password, in two modes:
 //
 //  1. Account HAS a password — caller must supply the current one. We
@@ -616,6 +784,15 @@ clicking the link below:</p>
 shown at the top of the site after you log in.</p>`, htmlEscape(name), link, link)
 }
 
+func loginOTPEmail(name, otp string) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf(`<p>Hari Bol %s,</p>
+<p>Your account on <strong>Prabhupāda Says</strong> has been unverified for a
+while, so we need a quick one-time code before signing you in:</p>
+<p style="font-size:1.5rem;font-weight:600;letter-spacing:0.25em;margin:1.25rem 0;">%s</p>
+<p>This code expires in 10 minutes. If you didn't try to sign in, you can
+safely ignore this email.</p>`, htmlEscape(name), otp)
+}
+
 func htmlEscape(s string) string {
 	r := strings.NewReplacer(
 		"&", "&amp;",

pkg/oauth/state.go

@@ -19,11 +19,16 @@ import (
 // `Next` is the post-login redirect path on the frontend. We sign it (along
 // with Nonce + IssuedAt) under HMAC so a tampered ?next= can't redirect the
 // user to an arbitrary URL after sign-in.
+//
+// `LinkUserID` is set only by the /link/start endpoint — it pins the OAuth
+// callback to the user who initiated the link. An empty value means the
+// callback should run the normal sign-in / sign-up flow instead.
 type statePayload struct {
-	Nonce    string `json:"n"`        // 16 random bytes, base64-urlencoded
+	Nonce      string `json:"n"`            // 16 random bytes, base64-urlencoded
-	Next     string `json:"u"`        // safe path, validated by handler
+	Next       string `json:"u"`            // safe path, validated by handler
-	IssuedAt int64  `json:"t"`        // unix seconds
+	IssuedAt   int64  `json:"t"`            // unix seconds
-	Provider string `json:"p"`        // "google" | "facebook"
+	Provider   string `json:"p"`            // "google" | "facebook"
+	LinkUserID string `json:"l,omitempty"`  // user id to link the provider to, empty for sign-in flow
 }
 
 // stateMaxAge bounds how long a /start may be in flight. Ten minutes is
@@ -34,16 +39,20 @@ const stateMaxAge = 10 * time.Minute
 // EncodeState signs and packs a fresh state value bound to the given provider
 // and post-login redirect path. The returned string is what goes into both
 // the `state` query param and the cookie.
-func EncodeState(secret []byte, provider, next string) (string, error) {
+//
+// `linkUserID` pins the callback to a specific user (link-to-current-user
+// flow). Pass "" for the normal sign-in flow.
+func EncodeState(secret []byte, provider, next, linkUserID string) (string, error) {
 	nonceB := make([]byte, 16)
 	if _, err := rand.Read(nonceB); err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("state nonce: %w", err)
 	}
 	p := statePayload{
-		Nonce:    base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(nonceB),
+		Nonce:      base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(nonceB),
-		Next:     next,
+		Next:       next,
-		IssuedAt: time.Now().Unix(),
+		IssuedAt:   time.Now().Unix(),
-		Provider: provider,
+		Provider:   provider,
+		LinkUserID: linkUserID,
 	}
 	body, err := json.Marshal(p)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -59,30 +68,33 @@ func EncodeState(secret []byte, provider, next string) (string, error) {
 // DecodeState verifies the signature, checks the freshness window, and
 // returns the embedded payload. Any failure surfaces as ErrInvalidState so
 // the handler maps it to a single error path.
-func DecodeState(secret []byte, raw string) (provider, next string, err error) {
+//
+// `linkUserID` is empty for sign-in flows and set for link-to-current-user
+// flows — callers should branch on it.
+func DecodeState(secret []byte, raw string) (provider, next, linkUserID string, err error) {
 	parts := strings.SplitN(raw, ".", 2)
 	if len(parts) != 2 {
-		return "", "", ErrInvalidState
+		return "", "", "", ErrInvalidState
 	}
 	bodyEnc, sigEnc := parts[0], parts[1]
 	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, secret)
 	mac.Write([]byte(bodyEnc))
 	expected := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
 	if !hmac.Equal([]byte(expected), []byte(sigEnc)) {
-		return "", "", ErrInvalidState
+		return "", "", "", ErrInvalidState
 	}
 	body, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(bodyEnc)
 	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", ErrInvalidState
+		return "", "", "", ErrInvalidState
 	}
 	var p statePayload
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &p); err != nil {
-		return "", "", ErrInvalidState
+		return "", "", "", ErrInvalidState
 	}
 	if time.Since(time.Unix(p.IssuedAt, 0)) > stateMaxAge {
-		return "", "", ErrInvalidState
+		return "", "", "", ErrInvalidState
 	}
-	return p.Provider, p.Next, nil
+	return p.Provider, p.Next, p.LinkUserID, nil
 }
 
 // ErrInvalidState is returned whenever signature or freshness checks fail.